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THE IMPACT OF U.S. TRADE LAW ACTIONS
ON GOVERNMENT POLICY DECISIONS
IN KOREA
Jong-Kap Kim*
INTRODUCTION

It is my great pleasure to be present at the "Symposium on U.S.Korea and U.S.-Taiwan Trade Law Issues in Comparative Perspective" hosted by the University of Michigan. I believe that this symposium will contribute to further understanding of Korean-U.S. trade
relations and thereby help consolidate economic partnership between
the two countries.
I would, first of all, like to briefly review the recent trends in bilateral trade and U.S. trade policies from the perspective of the United
States' trading partners. I would then like to make a presentation on
the impact of U.S. trade law actions on government policy decisions
in Korea - a major topic at this symposium. In conclusion, I would
like to suggest ways to help strengthen trade relations between Korea
and the United States over the long run.
RECENT TRENDS IN BILATERAL TRADE

The trade and economic relationship between Korea and the
United States has matured and contributed to the prosperity of both
countries. The United States has continued to be Korea's largest trading partner, and Korea is now the United States' seventh largest trading partner, surpassing both France and Italy.
Although Korea generally recorded large annual trade deficits
with the U.S. until 1982, the recent trend of bilateral trade surpluses
beginning in 1982 has been of particular concern to Korea. However,
Korea's bilateral trade surplus with the U.S. has fallen drastically
since the end of 1988.
For the first nine months of 1989, U.S. exports to Korea increased
by 25.7 percent, notably higher than our overall import growth rate of
18.7 percent. Over the same period, our exports to the United States
actually declined by 1.6 percent. The ongoing slowdown in Korean
exports to the U.S. is mainly attributable to the 32.8 percent apprecia* Director, United States Division, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic of Korea.
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tion of the won against the U.S. dollar from September, 1985, through
October, 1989. Currency value is likewise a major factor in the
growth of U.S. exports to Korea, along with expanded market access
for American goods. For 1989 as a whole, we project that Korea's
trade surplus with the U.S. will fall to $5 billion from $8.6 billion in
1988 and $9.6 billion in 1987.
Although this rapid progress toward greater balance is due in part
to the freer play of market forces, it also reflects specific actions undertaken by the U.S. and Korean governments. For our part, we have
tried to act consistently within a liberal policy framework, implementing market-opening measures at home and working to promote such
policies in multilateral forums. We have adopted this position because
we believe it is the best way to strengthen the Korean economy, so as
to compete internationally and, ultimately, to enhance the living standards of our people. We also seek to continue our strong bilateral
relationship with the United States and other trading partners because
we believe that the continued cooperation of the two countries will
contribute not only to our own economic development, but also to
world economic prosperity.

U.S.

TRADE POLICIES FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF
U.S. TRADING PARTNERS

With this background information in mind, I would now like to
turn to U.S. trade policies. In my view, the United States is still one of
the most open markets in the world. It is also arguable, however, that
the U.S. has been shifting its trade policies in a protectionist direction,
a direction that is often termed "managed trade."
U.S. trade policies could be characterized as a mixture of both bilateral and multilateral approaches. The U.S. Administration's "top
trade liberalization priority" is to successfully conclude the Uruguay
Round ("UR") of multilateral trade negotiations in order to develop
rules to cover agricultural trade and new areas such as services, investment, and intellectual property rights. The U.S. government, however, frequently pursues a bilateral approach in an effort to remove or
reduce so-called "trade barriers" under U.S. domestic trade acts.
On the side of imports, the U.S. takes various measures to justify
protection for U.S. industries "injured or likely to be injured" by import surges or other foreign "unfair trade practices" under U.S. domestic trade regulations. Although the U.S. government announced a
"Fair Trade Policy" in September, 1985, under the Reagan Administration, it has continued to resort to safeguard measures as a major
tool to protect declining domestic industries.
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These trade regulations have been further intensified by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. This Act introduced the
so-called "Super 301" provisions with a view to bilaterally addressing
trade problems with U.S. trading partners. The Act also strengthened
such provisions as section 201, section 337, and the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws in order to effectively provide protection for
domestic industries.
The Omnibus Trade Act and the measures taken under the Act
have been criticized by U.S. trading partners in GATT consultations
and other bilateral and multilateral trade forums. These countries
have argued that unilateral and protectionist measures taken by the
United States are inconsistent with GATT and may thereby jeopardize
the ongoing Uruguay Round of multilateral trade talks.
U.S. trading partners have contended that the Super 301 provisions are unilateral in nature, in that th1e measures taken under them
are based on unilateral criteria of "unfairness." The U.S. Trade Representative stated that "the United States would use Super 301 negotiations to support and complement the U.S. government's Uruguay
Round efforts." In the view of U.S. trade partners, however, this approach will expand bilateralism, which is hardly consistent with the
ongoing multilateral approach.
U.S. trading partners also argue that U.S. import restrictions may
discourage multilateral efforts, especially with regard to the "standstill
and rollback commitment." The U.S. government recently extended
the existing voluntary restraint arrangements (VRAs) on steel imports, and it also decided to extend the current textile agreements with
textile exporting countries.
In the opinion of its trading partners, U.S. trade policies are contradictory: making threats to compel those partners to eliminate "unfair practices" on the one hand, while intensifying import restrictions
on the other. These restrictions serve as barriers to trade and are inconsistent with the U.S. government's own efforts to open U.S. trading
partners' markets. They also contradict the spirit of GATT.
IMPACT OF

U.S.

TRADE LAW ACTIONS ON GOVERNMENT POLICY
DECISIONS IN KOREA

I would now like to proceed to the major issue of today's symposium: the impact of U.S. trade law actions on government policy decisions in Korea. In general, Korea has been forthcoming in addressing
trade issues of concern to the United States, in order to solve trade
problems before they become explosive political issues in both countries. Trade problems, if politicized, work against the interests of the
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two countries. This is especially true given the fact that anti-American elements in Korea have been growing in recent years, partly due
to mounting U.S. pressures on Korea with respect to market liberalization. The two governments, however, have effectively handled bilateral trade issues and are optimistic that they will be able to resolve
pending issues in a mutually satisfactory manner.
I will explain in detail the procedures involved in resolving trade
cases that have been filed recently under U.S. trade laws.
Super 301 Actions
Under the Super 301 provision of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "1988 Trade Act") the
U.S. government was mandated to identify "Priority Foreign Countries" ("PFC") and "Priority Practices" ("PP") by the end of May,
1989. Such identification was then to trigger an investigation and negotiations with U.S. trading partners over the succeeding twelve to
eighteen months, a period during which the offending trade barriers
were to be removed.
The Korean government began to contact the U.S. government informally in December, 1988, to determine whether Korea could be
omitted from the PFC list if it agreed to seek a negotiated settlement.
Officials of the two governments met three times in Washington. As a
result, a decision was made to negotiate on three major issues of concern to the United States - namely, agriculture, localization, and investment policies in Korea.
Three major reasons for Korea's decision to seek negotiations with
the U.S. included the following: first, it would be in the interests of
both countries if they could resolve their trade problems in advance,
before these issues ignited domestic political controversy; second, the
two governments felt that they could resolve these problems even
though Korea might make fewer concessions than would have become
necessary at a later stage if Korea were designated a PFC; third, Korea, as long as it was not designated a PFC or "unfair trader," would
be perceived as a responsible trading partner, not only in the United
States but also in the world trading community.
As is well known, the two governments reached agreements on
these three trade issues through three rounds of formal consultations
in Washington. The series of formal and informal consultations lasted
for about six months.
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Agriculture
On April 8, 1989, before the two governments began formal consultations, the Korean government unilaterally announced a threeyear agricultural liberalization plan covering 243 items, seventy of
which were of interest to the U.S. The Korean government's view was
that agricultural liberalization measures should take into account Korea's domestic agricultural structure and, because of the sensitivity of
the issue in Korea, should not be considered a matter for negotiation.
Although at the formal consultations the U.S. government strongly
requested that further liberalization measures be taken before Korea
could be omitted from the agricultural PP list, Korea was not in a
position to change the three-year liberalization plan that it had already
announced to the public. Any change in the plan would have damaged
the credibility of the Korean government. Moreover, it would certainly have provoked intense domestic political controversy.
The U.S. government seemed to take the view that all agricultural
issues involving Korea should be dealt with in a multilateral rather
than bilateral forum to minimize friction between the two countries.
Furthermore, it seemed to believe that the GATT balance of payment
("BOP") consultations would conclude that Korea would not be justified in invoking article 18B on the basis of developing country status.
In fact, in the October BOP consultations, Korea was graduated from
article 18B, and was thereby required to take liberalization measures
within the next eight years.
In the agricultural agreement under Super 301, Korea reconfirmed
its earlier liberalization plan, agreed to reduce tariffs on seven items of
interest to the U.S., and committed itself to removing technical barriers involving agricultural products. The agricultural sector in Korea
will pose difficult social and economic problems as import controls are
generally phased out. About one in five Koreans still depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and the plight of the farmers is an important public concern. However, virtually all manufactured goods (99.5
percent) are importable into Korea under automatic import licensing,
and the overall liberalization ratio is 95.5 percent, comparable to that
of many developed countries. Overall tariffs were slashed nearly in
half, from 23.7 percent in 1983, to 12.7 percent in 1989, and will drop
to 7.9 percent by 1993. From 1983 to 1989, tariffs for manufactured
goods were cut by more than half, from 22.6 percent to 11.2 percent,
with a further drop to 6.2 percent scheduled by 1993.
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Localization
The second issue of concern to the U.S. in the Super 301 negotiations was Korea's localization policies. For the purpose of negotiation, localization policies were defined as measures taken by the
Korean government to promote domestic industry. These included
import restrictions and standard-setting procedures. Some types of
import restrictions were termed "border closure measures," defined as
measures taken by the Korean government, inconsistent with GATT
safeguard provisions, to promote localization in response to petitions
filed by Korean industries.
Regarding this issue, the Korean government agreed to terminate
all remaining border closure measures and to do its utmost to ensure
that the application of the safeguard provisions of Korea's Foreign
Trade Law would be consistent with article 19 of the GATT. Korea
also agreed to simplify import procedures and abide by the GATT
Standards Code with respect to standards, technical regulations, quality controls, testing and certification.
In its own interest, the Korean government had already begun, in
early 1989, to streamline regulations governing imports. A special
task force was formed within the government to review forty individual laws, with a view to bringing import procedures more into line
with international rules. The localization part of the Super 301 agreements, therefore, reflected the Korean government's plan to reduce or
remove import-distortive regulations. The two governments easily
compromised their differences and reached an agreement in the early
part of formal consultations.
Foreign Direct Investment
The third area of Super 301 consultations involved the foreign direct investment ("FDI") policies of the Korean government. FDI in
the manufacturing sector is allowed with virtually no government
controls, except for regulations with respect to national security, environmental controls, and other purposes generally permitted
internationally.
In the FDI agreement, Korea committed itself to terminating performance requirements that had been imposed on foreign investors as
a term or condition of investment or receipt of incentives. For the purpose of the agreement, performance requirements were defined as requirements to export goods or services, to use local content, to transfer
or license technology, to restrict remittances related to investment,
and so forth. Korea in recent years had, except in a small number of
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situations, seldom enforced such requirements. One such instance was
where foreign-invested firms were not allowed to import a raw material (milk, for example), but instead were required to source it locally.
Korea also agreed to move on a gradual basis from the current
"case-by-case approval system" to an "automatic approval" or "notification" system by January, 1993. Since there were restrictions on FDI
in the areas of agriculture and services, Korea agreed to develop and
implement further progressive foreign investment liberalization steps.
This part of the Super 301 agreements highlights the way Korean
government policy has been increasingly directed toward liberalization
and internationalization of the Korean economy. In my view, the
agreements provide a reasonable timetable for Korean liberalization of
foreign direct investment, since Korea also plans to begin liberalizing
capital markets and foreign indirect investment beginning in 1992.
At present the Korean government considers the Super 301 negotiations to have marked a milestone in resolving trade problems through
dialogue. The Korean government did its best to respond to U.S. requests despite intense opposition within Korea. Korea sees this outcome as very significant for our bilateral cooperation in the future, and
we believe that full implementation of the agreement is of critical importance. Thus, we are paying special attention to the follow-up measures for implementing the agreement.
I would, however, like to call your attention to the fact that after
we reached the "Super 301" agreement last May, most Koreans expected bilateral trade frictions to end and our bilateral trade relationship to move onto a smoother plane. Contrary to that expectation, a
series of new trade requests has been made by the United States.
Many Koreans are frustrated by the fact that frictions continue despite
Korea's having made such substantial concessions to the U.S. in the
Super 301 negotiations.
Two of the countries designated as PFCs in May have thus far
refused to enter into negotiations. Yet the U.S. has not responded.
Thus, in comparative terms, most Koreans do not see how the May
agreement contributed to resolving bilateral trade friction. This kind
of criticism is very evident in our National Assembly and in the media.
Telecommunications
The U.S. Trade Representative identified Korea and the EC as priority countries under section 1374(a) of the 1988 Trade Act on January 19, 1989. In addition, the U.S. government decided to review
existing telecommunications agreements with Japan and other countries. The USTR reportedly reviewed thirteen foreign trading part-
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ners. As guidelines in the investigation process, the Trade Policy Staff
Committee (TPSC) took into account, among other factors, those
listed in section 1374(b):
(1) the nature and significance of the act, policies, and practices that
deny mutually advantageous market opportunities to telecommunications products and services of United States firms;
(2) the economic benefits (actual and potential) accruing to foreign
firms from open access to the United States market;
(3) the potential size of the market of a foreign country for telecommunications products and services of United States firms;
(4) the potential to increase United States exports of telecommunications products and services, either directly or through the establishment
of a beneficial precedent; and
(5) measurable progress being made to eliminate the objectionable
acts, policies, or practices.
The Korean government's view, however, is that the U.S. decision
was based primarily on the third factor, namely, the potential size of
the foreign country's market. In fact, Korea has progressively liberalized the telecommunications market in recent years, and its market is
generally considered more open than that of any other developing
country. Moreover, it is well known that there are many developing
countries that have virtually closed telecommunications markets
whose governments do not plan to open them to foreign competition.
It would hardly be justified for the U.S. to penalize a country that is
moving in the right direction, even if the potential size of Korea's market is attractive to U.S. industry. Another important aspect of the
issue is that Uruguay Round services consultations have been proceeding and that telecommunications services are under discussion in those
talks. In this regard, the bilateral approach that the U.S. has taken
may not necessarily be consistent with the Uruguay Round's multilateral approach.
The Korean government, however, has met with the U.S. government in an effort to address U.S. concerns within the framework of
Korea's plan to liberalize the telecommunications market. Although
the two governments were not able to reach an agreement in the past
two rounds of consultations, the Korean government will be making a
concerted effort to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding before
February 18, 1990, the due date for telecommunications consultations
under the 1988 Trade Act.
Intellectual Property Rights
In 1985, the U.S. government initiated a section 301 investigation
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of Korean government policies designed to protect intellectual property rights (IPRs).
As a result of consultations between the two governments, a comprehensive legal framework for the protection of intellectual property
rights in Korea was put in place on July 1, 1987. This included revision of the patent and copyright laws and implementation of a new law
regarding computer programs.
Apart from protection available under the Korean legal system,
the Korean government reached an understanding with the United
States on July 21, 1986, to provide some measure of retroactive protection (by means of "administrative guidance") for the following American IPRs:
Pipeline products patented in the United States between January 1, 1980, and June 30, 1989, but not marketed in the United States
or Korea, with guidance extended for ten years;
- Copyrights registered between July 1, 1977, and June 30, 1987,
with guidance extended for the duration of the copyright;
Computer programs copyrighted between July 1, 1982, and
June 30, 1987, with guidance extended for the duration of the
copyright.
Korea also acceded to U.S. requests to convert "process" patent
applications to "product" patent applications (some 1,370 products at
the time of the negotiation) when the amended patent law went into
effect in July, 1987.
Such special and deferential treatment was accorded to U.S. IPRs
in response to American requests and in recognition of the singular
importance of the bilateral trade relationship to Korea.
Despite these legal and administrative measures, problems remain
in the area of enforcement. Such circumstances are attributable to a
traditional lack of awareness in Korea that IPR protection is an economic desideratum and essential to the healthy development of domestic industries. To address these problem areas and to demonstrate the
government's unequivocal commitment to effective IPR protection,
the cabinet established a permanent inter-agency Task Force in December 1988.
At the recommendation of the Task Force, the Prosecutor General's Office designated special enforcement teams in forty-nine prosecutors' offices nationwide to implement IPR protection. The teams
will target large-scale manufacturers. Currently, a total of 120 investigators, 340 police officers, and 440 related specialists dealing solely
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with IPR protection matters work under the prosecutors in these
offices.
In May, 1989, as Korea continued to make efforts to provide effective IPR protection, the U.S. government placed Korea on a "Priority
Watch List" ("PWL") together with seven other countries, although it
did not designate any country by itself as a priority country. The U.S.
government announced that it was not identifying a priority country
under Special 301 because significant progress had been made in a
number of negotiations. However, the U.S. singled out twenty-five
countries whose practices deserved special attention. Seventeen of
those countries were placed on a "Watch List" ("WL"), while the remaining eight countries were placed on a PWL.
On November 1, the USTR announced changes in its earlier decision. Korea was moved from the PWL to the WL. Korea's efforts
over the previous several months in deploying the IPR Task Force had
drawn some measure of recognition from the U.S. government.
The Korean government will continue to take relevant actions, not
only to avoid trade friction with Korea's trading partners but also to
promote R&D by domestic industries, encourage a fair domestic trading environment, and protect Korea's own IPRs abroad.
The number of IPR trade conflicts is increasing, and Korea fully
recognizes the need to establish a set of rules in the Uruguay Round to
address this issue. In this regard, Korea supports efforts to formulate
standards for IPR protection and to strengthen the GATT dispute settlement mechanism. Additionally, Korea has been playing a constructive mediating role between developed and developing countries in this
area.
Antidumping, Countervailing,and Safeguard Measures
U.S. firms and/or labor unions frequently file antidumping or
countervailing duty petitions against imports from abroad. As Korea
has virtually eliminated export subsidies, countervailing duty investigations since 1984 have resulted in "de minimis" decisions or marginal
duty levels. Recognizing the shift in Korea's trade policies, the U.S.
government did not raise this issue with reference to Korea in the U.S.
"National Trade Estimate" report on foreign trade barriers published
in April, 1989. Antidumping petitions, however, have had a substantial impact on Korean exports to the U.S. Some seventy percent of the
cases were finally decided as either "no injury" cases or "no dumping"
cases. Although Korean exporters in these cases were exonerated
from any wrongdoing, in almost all cases they had lost market share in
the U.S. American importers had switched sources from the Korean
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firms subject to investigation to firms in other countries. Such harassment tactics more than responses to actual dumping practices have
adversely affected Korean exports to the U.S.
In the face of the hardship endured by Korean traders and American importers, the Korean government in May, 1989, submitted a detailed proposal to the MTN Negotiating Group regarding the GATT
Anti-Dumping Code. The proposal, based on a careful study of the
Anti-Dumping Code as well as national legislation and practices, covers fifteen topics and deals with both substantive and procedural
issues.
The U.S. imposes certain restrictions on Korean imports, restrictions that tend to contradict its proclaimed free trade policy, while
continuing to make requests that Korea open its markets. The steel
VRA expired in September, 1989, but was extended to March, 1992,
even though steel imports into the U.S. have steadily declined, domestic employment has substantially increased, and the capacity utilization rate is well above average. The U.S. textile industry has been
protected since 1961 and, although the ongoing Uruguay Round is
trying to integrate textiles into the GATT, the U.S. is currently seeking to strengthen textile import restrictions as well.
Although Korea has been officially recognized as a fair trader in
steel, the Korean government was forced to negotiate a steel VRA.
U.S. steel producers were threatening to file anti-dumping and countervailing duty petitions. Some Korean firms preferred not to accept a
VRA, confident that they could successfully defend themselves against
any trade cases, while others preferred to avoid further trade harassment if a substantial quota could be secured. The two governments
reached an agreement in October, 1989.
The two governments are currently negotiating the terms and conditions of a textile agreement. The past four rounds of negotiations
have not yet been successful in reaching a final agreement. The Korean textile industry has recently been experiencing great difficulties
due to wage increases, and another extension of the textile agreement
will affect textile exports further in the years ahead.
SUGGESTIONS FOR STRENGTHENING TRADE RELATIONS BETWEEN

KOREA AND THE U.S.

I would like to suggest that the United States take certain actions
to strengthen both U.S.-Korean trade relations and the world trading
system. My suggestions will focus on three areas: multilateral issues,
bilateral issues, and regional issues.
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First, the United States and Korea have been actively participating
in the Uruguay Round from the outset of the MTN in 1986. The U.S.
government, however, seems to be concentrating mainly on issues of
concern to the United States. The outcome of the Uruguay Round
should reflect the interests of both developed and developing countries
in order to produce a real "multilateral trade regime." We are concerned that the U.S. approach may lead to a "minilateral trade regime," in which only a handful of "like-minded" nations will join and
the rest will be left out. Korea, as one of the NICs, will continue to
play a mediating role in seeking to reconcile the interests of both developed and developing countries. The U.S. and Korea should work
together closely during the remainder of the round to help it reach a
successful conclusion. The hope would be to strengthen the world
trading regime and benefit all trading nations, both developed and
developing.
Second, the U.S. and Korea so far have handled bilateral trade
problems fairly well. But the differences in perception that exist, along
with excessive U.S. pressures on Korea, generate political controversies within as well as between the two countries. The U.S. perceives
Korea as a "second Japan." The policy that there should "never again
be a second Japan" propels its search for a "level playing field" in its
trade with Korea. Korea, for its part, sees itself as one of the few
countries, developed or developing, that is moving consistently and
rapidly to open its domestic market to the free flow of imports. Hence,
Korea views many of the U.S. requests as unjustified.
It is also my personal view that Korea has been moving in the right
direction and has been forthcoming in addressing the concerns of all
its trading partners, including the U.S. The Super 301 agreement
reached in May, 1989, is one example of the efforts Korea has made.
Korea is currently in the midst of a tumultuous democratization process, and strong domestic opposition to further market liberalization
exists. Excessive pressure by the U.S. would put the Korean government in a more difficult situation vis-A-vis its own trade policies and
would play into the hands of minority anti-American elements in the
country.
Third, the U.S. government is now becoming increasingly interested in Asian-Pacific Rim cooperation as the European Single Market
approaches in 1992. The countries of this region, as we all know, differ from one another in their history, culture, and degree of economic
development - to a much greater degree than in Europe. Nevertheless, there is considerable room for closer regional economic coopera-
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tion. Toward this end, the United States and Korea are in a position to
play major facilitative roles.
CLOSING
Korea provides a good example of a U.S. foreign policy success.
Korea has experienced impressive economic and political development
in recent years. The success that the United States and Korea have
together achieved deserves to be encouraged rather than penalized.

